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A DILEMMA FOR NEO-ARISTOTELIAN SUPEREROGATION 
Alan T. Wilson 
 
ABSTRACT: It has recently been argued that virtue ethics cannot accommodate the 
possibility of supererogation. In response, Rebecca Stangl proposes a neo-Aristotelian 
account of supererogation that, she argues, generates plausible verdicts, while also 
being compatible with the doctrine of the mean. I argue that Stangl’s response is 
unsuccessful. First, I demonstrate that the proposal in its current form is 
problematically indeterminate, meaning that we cannot know what verdicts would be 
produced in response to classic examples. Second, I argue that anyone attempting to 
develop the account faces a dilemma, and that both options for responding to this 
dilemma generate problematic results. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of supererogation presents a challenge for ethical theorists. Following J. O. Urmson’s 
influential “Saints and Heroes”, it has become necessary for theorists to demonstrate that their 
chosen theory provides a plausible account of supererogation, or else to explain why such an 
account is unnecessary. Rebecca Stangl (2016) has recently addressed this challenge from the 
perspective of virtue ethics. Stangl proposes a neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation that, 
she argues, generates plausible verdicts, while also being compatible with the Aristotelian 
doctrine of the mean. In this way, Stangl rejects the claim that virtue ethics fails to accommodate 
supererogation. 
 
In this paper, I argue that Stangl’s attempt to reconcile virtue ethics and supererogation is 
unsuccessful. First, I explain why the level of detail provided by Stangl is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the account would generate intuitively plausible results. I then argue that 
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Stangl faces a dilemma in deciding how best to add the necessary detail. In particular, I argue 
that Stangl’s account will generate unintuitive verdicts regardless of the position taken on the 
importance of the internal targets of virtue. Given these issues, virtue ethicists may be forced to 
choose between accepting a highly revisionary account of supererogation, or else refusing to 
accept the possibility of supererogation altogether. 
 
I. SUPEREROGATION 
Urmson’s “Saints and Heroes” argues for the existence of a category of action that cannot be 
reduced to the conventional categories of obligatory, permissible, and forbidden acts.1 Allowing 
for only these three categories fails to acknowledge the possibility of actions that go beyond what 
is morally required. Such actions would be neither obligatory nor forbidden, but they would also 
not be merely permissible. Actions of this sort have come to be referred to as supererogatory, 
and Urmson argues for their existence by way of examples. Two of these examples can be set out 
as follows: 
 
Soldier: We may imagine a squad of soldiers practising the throwing of live grenades. 
A grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on the ground near the squad. 
One soldier sacrifices their life by throwing themselves on the grenade, thereby 
shielding their comrades. 
 
Doctor: We may imagine a doctor, no differently situated from countless other 
doctors, who becomes aware of the great suffering of people in some far away, 
plague-ridden city. Upon learning of this fact, the doctor volunteers to travel to the 
city and join the depleted medical forces that are based there.2 
 
Urmson’s claim is that the agents in these examples are acting in ways that are neither forbidden 
nor obligatory. It would be overly demanding to claim that the other soldiers or other doctors had 
committed a moral wrong by failing to throw themselves on the live grenade, or by failing to move 
to the plague-ridden city. The actions involved in Soldier and Doctor also appear to go beyond 
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what would be merely permissible. We, therefore, have intuitively appealing examples of 
supererogatory actions, of actions that are beyond the call of duty. This presents a challenge for 
any ethical theory that does not accommodate the existence of such actions. 
 
I will not here repeat the arguments that have been used to show that standard virtue ethical 
accounts cannot accommodate supererogation.3 Instead, I will focus specifically on Stangl’s 
recent attempt to respond to this issue.4 
 
II. STANGL’S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT 
Stangl’s account of supererogation builds upon the work of Christine Swanton, and is set out as 
follows: 
 
An action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either (a) the 
omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or 
(b) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose 
performance in its place would not be overall vicious.5 
 
To evaluate this account, it is necessary to first clarify the key concepts of “overall virtuous” and 
“overall vicious” action. For this reason, it is important to briefly explain those elements of 
Swanton’s work that are relied upon by Stangl. 
 
Swanton argues that we can helpfully think of virtues as having various items within their 
characteristic fields of concern.6 Different virtues will be concerned with a different range of 
items. For example, “bodily pleasures” will be included as items within the field of temperance, 
whereas “dangerous situations” will be of more concern to courage.7 Importantly, each virtue 
can be expected to have a plurality of items within its field, and possessing a given virtue just is 
a matter of being disposed to respond to those items in an appropriate way. When an agent 
succeeds in responding in an appropriate way to one of these items, we can say that they have 
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“hit the target” of the corresponding virtue.8 Swanton provides the following examples of items 
within the fields of certain virtues, and of the appropriate modes of response: 
 
The virtue of justice is primarily concerned with the honouring of rules of justice by 
adhering to those rules oneself, and with respect for the status of individuals… Many 
virtues, such as that of friendship, exhibit many modes of moral acknowledgement. A 
good friend does not merely promote the good of her friend: she appreciates her 
friend, respects, cares for, and even loves her friend.9 
 
The virtue of justice has rules and other persons as items within its characteristic field of concern, 
and the appropriate modes of response are to honour the rules (by following them) and respect 
the persons. The proposed virtue of friendship (or friendliness) has the friend as an item of 
concern, and appropriate modes of response include promoting the friend’s well-being, as well 
as caring for, loving, and respecting the friend. 
 
With this understanding of virtue in place, Swanton then provides her account of the distinction 
between an act from virtue and a virtuous act.10 An act from virtue is one that expresses or 
exhibits the agent’s actual possession of the relevant dispositions. For example, an act from 
justice would be one that expresses the agent’s underlying dispositions to adhere to the rules of 
fairness and to respect other people. A virtuous act, on the other hand, is one that hits the target 
of virtue, regardless of whether the agent in question possesses the relevant dispositions. For 
example, a just act could be one that adheres to the rules of fairness, even if the agent in question 
is not generally disposed to do so. Stangl follows Swanton when defining virtuous actions and 
overall virtuous actions: 
 
Virtuous Action: An action is virtuous in respect V (e.g., benevolent, generous) if and 




Overall Virtuous Action: Overall virtuousness is a function of the virtuousness of 
actions in these more particular respects. If only one virtue is relevant in a situation, 
then overall virtuousness will consist simply in hitting the target of that virtue. But in 
those cases in which more than one virtue is relevant, which action counts as overall 
virtuous is determined by the relative importance of the differing virtues at issue.11 
 
Overall virtuousness, then, is a matter of hitting the target(s) of those virtues that are relevant in 
the situation. This provides us with a definition of the first key concept that appears in Stangl’s 
account of supererogation. The second key concept is that of overall viciousness. Building on the 
work of Swanton once more, Stangl defines overall viciousness as follows: 
 
Vicious Action: An action is vicious in respect R (e.g., stingy, unjust) if and only if it 
constitutes a failure to hit the target of its corresponding virtue V (e.g., generosity, 
justice) in the manner distinctive of that vice (e.g., giving too little, failing to respect 
rights). 
 
Overall Vicious Action: Overall viciousness, in turn, is a function of the viciousness of 
actions in these more particular respects. If only one virtue is relevant in a situation, 
then overall viciousness will consist simply in a failure to hit the target of that virtue.12 
 
With these details in place, it is possible to understand Stangl’s neo-Aristotelian account of 
supererogation. A morally right action is one that is overall virtuous. A morally wrong action is 
one that is overall vicious. A supererogatory action is one that is overall virtuous and where either 
(a) failing to perform an overall virtuous act would not have been overall vicious, or (b) some 
other overall virtuous act was available that was less virtuous than the action performed. 
 
Stangl has two aims when defending this account. The first is to demonstrate that it is compatible 
with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. The second is to demonstrate that it generates 
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intuitively plausible judgements concerning supererogatory acts. I will focus on the second of 
these aims. 
 
Does Stangl’s account generate plausible verdicts in response to the classic Soldier and Doctor 
examples? Consider first the Soldier example. The soldier who dives onto the live grenade in 
order to save their comrades plausibly hits the targets of relevant virtues. They overcome fear in 
order to promote something of value in a genuinely dangerous situation, thereby hitting a target 
of courage. They also successfully protect and promote the well-being of their comrades, thereby 
hitting a plausible target of benevolence. The action of the solider, therefore, looks likely to be 
classed as overall virtuous, and so is eligible for supererogatory status. Whether or not it achieves 
that status depends on the virtuousness or viciousness of the alternative actions that were 
available. 
 
Stangl states that it would not have been overall vicious to refrain from jumping on the grenade 
in this example. We are told that it is not “plausible” to describe the failure to act in such cases 
as overall vicious, and that “we do not think that the beneficiaries of the soldier’s action acted 
viciously in not jumping on the grenade.”13 If this is correct, then the solider has performed an 
overall virtuous action, the omission of which would not have been overall vicious. In this way, 
Stangl argues that her account generates the (correct) verdict that Soldier is an example of 
supererogation. 
 
Similar moves are made to suggest that Doctor would also be supererogatory on Stangl’s account. 
Stangl asks us to compare the doctor who moves to work in challenging and dangerous 
circumstances, with a colleague who declines such a move, but who continues to serve the local 
area in a fair and considerate way.14 Stangl suggests that both agents act in a way that is overall 
virtuous, but that choosing to move is slightly more virtuous. Therefore, on the neo-Aristotelian 
account, Doctor will be (correctly) categorised as an example of supererogation. The doctor’s 
actions are overall virtuous, and some alternative overall virtuous action was available that would 
have been less virtuous. If this is right, Stangl will have successfully demonstrated that her 
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account generates plausible verdicts in response to Urmson’s classic examples. I will now argue 
that Stangl is not, in fact, successful in this regard. 
 
III. THE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT 
One of Stangl’s key aims is to demonstrate that her account will generate intuitively plausible 
results. However, the level of detail provided by Stangl is not sufficient to allow us to work out 
what verdicts would be generated in response to examples, and so is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that plausible verdicts would be forthcoming. The difficulty for Stangl stems from 
the understandings of “overall virtuous” and “overall vicious” that are used in the account. 
 
Regarding the understanding of overall virtuous action, Stangl explains that this concept lends 
itself to both a strong and a weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, an overall virtuous 
action will be one that hits all of the targets of all relevant virtues, and to the highest degree 
possible. Stangl instead favours a weak interpretation, which she explains by providing a direct 
quote from Swanton: 
 
An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is good enough, 
even if not the (or a) best action. Here it is assumed that there is much latitude in 
hitting the target of virtues such as generosity. Right acts range from the truly splendid 
and admirable to acts which are “all right”.15 
 
However, this understanding of the weaker interpretation of overall virtuousness is in conflict 
with Stangl’s account of supererogation. On this understanding, overall virtuous acts will include 
all of those that are “all right”. But, for Swanton, morally “all right” action is a technical term, 
meant to include all of those actions that are not overall vicious.16 Therefore, if Stangl follows 
Swanton in her understanding of the weak interpretation of overall virtuousness, then the first 
clause in her account of supererogation will be redundant. Overall virtuous acts will include all of 
those that are “all right”, and so will include all of those that are not overall vicious. This means 
that it could never be the case that failing to perform an overall virtuous action would not be 
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overall vicious. If Stangl continues to understand overall virtuousness in the way that is borrowed 
from Swanton, then the first clause of her account of supererogation (clause (a)) will never be 
satisfied. The only information we are given on how to understand overall virtuousness is 
presented by way of the direct quote from Swanton. Given that the position stated in that quote 
conflicts with Stangl’s account, it is not clear how overall virtuousness ought to be understood. 
This means that we cannot work out what verdicts would be generated by the neo-Aristotelian 
account. 
 
A similar problem arises for the understanding of overall viciousness that Stangl provides. Again, 
Stangl explains that this concept lends itself to both a strong and a weak interpretation. On the 
strong interpretation, an act will only be classified as overall vicious if it is “the, or a, worst 
possible action in the circumstances”, where this would involve failing to hit the targets of all 
relevant virtues in the most extreme way possible.17 Stangl again prefers a weaker interpretation. 
On the weaker interpretation, overall vicious actions will be those that are “bad enough even if 
not the (or a) worst action”.18 This definition tells us what is not required in order to be overall 
vicious (the act need not be the worst possible), but it does not tell us what is required. This lack 
of detail leaves us unable to determine what verdicts will be generated in specific cases. 
 
Consider again Urmson’s Soldier example. Stangl tells us that her account will generate the 
intuitively correct verdict here. The soldier’s action plausibly hits the targets of relevant virtues, 
such as courage and benevolence, and so looks likely to be classed as overall virtuous. The 
soldier’s action is therefore eligible for supererogatory status. In order for that status to be 
awarded, however, the actions of those who act differently must not be overall vicious.  
 
Stangl tells us that it would not be “plausible” to say that those who did not jump on the grenade 
acted viciously, and that “we do not think” that they would be acting viciously. But this is not the 
same as demonstrating that her account generates the correct result. Indeed, it does appear that 
the other soldiers are failing to hit the targets of relevant virtues. They fail to overcome fear in 
order to protect something of value (the lives of their fellow comrades) in a dangerous situation. 
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And they fail to act so as to protect and promote the well-being of others. In this way, the other 
soldiers fail to hit the targets of courage and benevolence. It is not clear, therefore, why failing 
to jump on the grenade will not be classed as overall vicious on Stangl’s account, especially given 
a weak interpretation of overall viciousness. While it may not be plausible to categorise these 
actions as overall vicious, it is not clear how Stangl’s account avoids the implausible verdict.19 The 
lack of detail provided when explaining the account means that we cannot confirm that the 
desired verdicts would be generated, and so Stangl has not succeeded in one of her key aims 
when defending the neo-Aristotelian account. 
 
This is a significant issue given Stangl’s strategy of defending her account by claiming that 
plausible verdicts would be forthcoming. If we cannot work out what verdicts would be 
generated, then Stangl’s strategy cannot succeed. However, it might be thought that this is 
merely a temporary set-back. All that has been argued so far is that the neo-Aristotelian account 
is problematically indeterminate. This is consistent with there being some straightforward way 
of developing the account so as to satisfy the stated aims (generating plausible verdicts, and 
being compatible with the doctrine of the mean). And yet, there is reason to believe that 
successfully developing Stangl’s account will be far from straightforward. In the next section, I 
will argue that anyone attempting to develop the neo-Aristotelian account faces a dilemma, and 
that both options for responding to this dilemma generate problematic results. 
 
IV. A DILEMMA 
To develop the neo-Aristotelian account, it is necessary to clarify the requirements for “overall 
virtuous” and “overall vicious” action. Stangl’s desire to avoid strong interpretations of these 
concepts is justified. To require that right (overall virtuous) actions must hit all of the targets of 
all relevant virtues, and to the greatest extent possible, would be overly demanding.20 Similarly, 
requiring that wrong (overall vicious) actions must fail to hit all of the targets of all relevant 
virtues, and in the most extreme way possible, would result in many wrong actions being classed 
as morally “all right”. We ought, therefore, to agree with Stangl, and reject strong interpretations 
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of overall virtuous and overall vicious action. It is necessary to develop weaker interpretations of 
these concepts that can then be deployed within the neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation. 
 
Rival interpretations of the key concepts will differ in terms of what can be referred to as the 
accuracy requirement and the range requirement. The range requirement sets out how many of 
the virtuous targets need to be hit (or missed) in order for an action to count as overall virtuous 
(or overall vicious). For example, one option is to require that only the main target of the most 
relevant virtue needs to be satisfied. If the most relevant virtue is friendship, then perhaps an 
overall virtuous action need only hit the target of promoting the well-being of the friend, even if 
the agent fails to hit the additional targets of actually caring for and respecting the friend. 
Alternatively, we might demand that every target of the most relevant virtue be satisfied. Overall 
virtuousness in the friendship example would then require that the agent care for and respect 
the friend, as well as promoting the friend’s well-being. Different understandings of the range 
requirement will result in different verdicts concerning when an action is overall virtuous (or 
overall vicious). The more demanding we make the requirement, the closer we will come to 
strong interpretations of these concepts. To defend the neo-Aristotelian account, it is necessary 
to demonstrate that there is some understanding of the range requirement that is compatible 
with the production of plausible verdicts concerning supererogation. 
 
Interpretations of overall virtuousness and overall viciousness will also differ in terms of the 
accuracy requirement. This requirement sets out how narrowly the targets of the relevant virtues 
ought to be construed. On the most demanding version of the accuracy requirement, the target 
of a virtue will be construed such that there is only one way of successfully hitting it.21  If a target 
of benevolence is to promote the well-being of others, then a demanding version of the accuracy 
requirement will state that hitting this target requires promoting well-being to the highest degree 
possible. On a less demanding version, hitting the target might only require promoting the well-
being of others to some lesser extent. Again, the more stringent this requirement, the closer we 
will be to the strong interpretations of overall virtuous and overall vicious action. To fully develop 
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the neo-Aristotelian account, we need to explain how both the range requirement and the 
accuracy requirement are to be understood. 
 
The problem is that it is not clear how we can understand these two requirements so as to 
provide interpretations of overall virtuous and overall vicious action that will ultimately generate 
plausible results. In order to demonstrate this problem, I will focus on one way in which we could 
understand the range requirement so as to generate the desired verdict in Soldier. My aim is to 
show that unintuitive results will be generated regardless of whether we accept this version of 
the requirement, and so supporters of the neo-Aristotelian account face a dilemma in deciding 
how to proceed. 
 
When deciding how to understand the range requirement, it is necessary to take a stand on the 
importance of the internal targets of relevant virtues. These are targets that involve feeling or 
being motivated in a particular way. For example, Swanton suggests that the virtue of friendship 
involves not only promoting the well-being of your friend (an external target), but also actually 
caring for and respecting your friend (internal targets). Similarly, the virtue of justice might 
involve acting in accordance with the rules of fairness, such as ensuring a fair distribution of a 
particular resource (an external target), as well as feeling the proper respect for others while 
doing so (an internal target). Focusing on internal targets provides a way of generating the 
desired verdict in examples like Soldier. 
 
On Stangl’s account, an action can only be categorised as supererogatory in cases where some 
alternative action was available that was not overall vicious. This means that the act of jumping 
on the grenade in Soldier will only be categorised as an example of supererogation if the 
alternative action of failing to jump on the grenade is not overall vicious. The problem is that this 
alternative action does appear to miss the targets of relevant virtues, such as courage and 
benevolence. However, the problematic verdict can be avoided if the range requirement is 
understood in a way that acknowledges the importance of internal targets. That is, we need to 
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understand the range requirement as allowing for the moral status of an action to be improved 
when the internal targets of relevant virtues are satisfied. 
 
In Soldier, the soldiers who fail to jump on the grenade do appear to miss the external targets of 
courage and benevolence. However, those soldiers might well be hitting the internal targets of 
these virtues. They might care about the well-being of their comrades, thereby hitting an internal 
target of benevolence. And they might generally be resolute in the face of danger, thereby hitting 
an internal target of courage. If we understand the range requirement as acknowledging the 
importance of internal targets, then we can say that the other soldiers are not acting in a way 
that is overall vicious. And this is what Stangl needs in order for the neo-Aristotelian account to 
correctly judge the act of jumping on the grenade in Soldier as supererogatory. 
 
Understanding the range requirement in this way would also allow the neo-Aristotelian account 
to generate plausible verdicts in additional cases. There is good reason to accept that internal 
states or motivations can determine whether or not an action should be classified as 
supererogatory.22 Consider the following variation on Urmson’s classic example: 
 
Modified Soldier: Angela is among a squad of soldiers practicing the throwing of live 
grenades. In an attempt to impress her comrades and deceive them into awarding her 
esteem, Angela plans to drop a dummy grenade on to which she will throw herself. 
However, Angela unknowingly drops a live grenade. Thinking there to be no real 
danger, Angela throws herself onto the live grenade.23 
 
Angela’s act of jumping on the grenade once it has been dropped hits the same external targets 
as in the original Soldier example (protecting the well-being of her comrades). However, Modified 
Soldier does not deserve to be classed as supererogatory. This can be explained by the fact that 
Angela’s motivations and concerns are not focused on the well-being of her comrades, and by 
the fact that her incorrect assessment of the situation means that she is not overcoming fear 
while protecting something of value. Angela therefore fails to hit the internal targets of relevant 
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virtues such as courage and benevolence towards her comrades.24 Understanding the range 
requirement in a way that acknowledges the importance of internal targets would allow a neo-
Aristotelian to rule out Modified Soldier as an example of supererogation, as well as generating 
the correct verdict in response to the original case. 
 
However, accepting that the moral status of an action is improved by hitting the internal targets 
of relevant virtues has other, more problematic, implications. The problem is that this will result 
in granting supererogatory status to actions that are more intuitively viewed as obligatory. 
Consider the following example: 
 
Debt: Brenda receives a significant loan from an acquaintance and promises to repay 
the money by a particular date. Feeling a deep respect for the rules of justice, Brenda 
carefully plans to ensure that she will make the repayments. When the due date 
arrives, Brenda successfully repays the loan. 
 
If we understand the range requirement as acknowledging the importance of internal targets, 
then Brenda’s repaying of the loan will be classed as supererogatory. An agent could have 
performed a morally right (overall virtuous) act simply by repaying the money. By repaying the 
money and doing so out of her respect for the rules of justice, Brenda hits both the external and 
the internal targets of a relevant virtue (justice). Brenda therefore performs an overall virtuous 
act (repaying the loan from an appropriate motive) that is more virtuous than an alternative 
overall virtuous act (repaying the loan without the appropriate motivation). Brenda’s act will 
therefore be classed as supererogatory by the neo-Aristotelian account once we acknowledge 
the importance of internal targets. 
 
This result will generalise. Morally right actions will become supererogatory whenever the agent 
performs the action while feeling the right way. This means that many plausibly obligatory actions 
will be categorised as supererogatory. Consider actions such as meeting a friend at an agreed 
upon time; completing your fair share of the marking load in your department; or ensuing that 
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the basic needs of your children are satisfied. If hitting the internal target of a relevant virtue can 
improve the moral status of an action, then all of these actions will be counted as supererogatory 
whenever the agent performs them while having the appropriate feelings. The actions will be 
overall virtuous, and will be more virtuous than some alternative action that is also overall 
virtuous (performing the action without the correct feeling). Those working on supererogation 
have not typically thought that actions such as paying back a loan or satisfying the basic needs of 
your children should be included as examples of supererogation. When focusing on the internal 
targets of virtue, the neo-Aristotelian account leads to unintuitive verdicts in these cases. 
 
A defender of Stangl’s neo-Aristotelian account therefore faces a dilemma when developing the 
account. In order to ensure that the desired verdict is generated in response to cases like Soldier 
and Modified Soldier, it will be necessary to allow that hitting (or missing) the internal targets of 
relevant virtues can affect the moral status of an action. However, a neo-Aristotelian account 
that allows for this will then produce unintuitive verdicts in response to everyday examples like 
Debt. Regardless of the position taken on the issue of internal targets, the neo-Aristotelian 
account will produce verdicts that many will find unintuitive. 
 
Given this issue, what options remain for a virtue ethical response to the challenge of 
supererogation? There appear to be four main options. If we agree with Stangl that the 
production of intuitive verdicts is a requirement for any successful account, then we might (i) 
reject the neo-Aristotelian account, and defend some alternative approach. Rival virtue ethical 
accounts of supererogation have been proposed elsewhere.25 Alternatively, we might (ii) reject 
the neo-Aristotelian account, and then deny that an account of supererogation is even necessary. 
Denying the possibility of supererogation has also been proposed elsewhere.26 These look to be 
the main options if we accept that a successful account of supererogation must be in-keeping 
with standard intuitions. 
 
A more interesting response from a virtue ethicist would be to deny that their account needs to 
satisfy standard intuitions, perhaps by arguing that those intuitions ought not to be trusted. In 
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taking this approach, it would be possible to accept the neo-Aristotelian account, and either (iii) 
deny that Solider is an example of supererogation, or (iv) argue that Debt really is an example of 
supererogation. In either case, some argument would then be required as to why we ought not 
to trust any contrary intuitions. 
 
I will not here discuss the merits of these four options. My aim in this paper has simply been to 
argue that the neo-Aristotelian account fails to satisfy Stangl’s aim of generating intuitively 
plausible verdicts in response to classic examples. If the neo-Aristotelian account is the best 
available, then virtue ethicists will be forced to choose between either continuing to accept that 
account (and so defending a revisionary understanding of supererogation), or else abandoning 
the attempt to accommodate supererogation altogether. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Rebecca Stangl has attempted to reconcile virtue ethics and supererogation by proposing a neo-
Aristotelian account of supererogatory acts. I have argued against that proposal in two ways. 
Firstly, I have argued that the proposal in its current form is problematically indeterminate, 
meaning that we cannot know what verdicts would be produced in response to classic examples. 
Secondly, I have argued that anyone attempting to develop the account faces a dilemma 
concerning the importance of the internal targets of virtue. Regardless of the position taken on 
this issue, unintuitive verdicts will be generated. Stangl has failed to demonstrate that virtue 
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